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Birth Pangs: Greenland’s Struggle For 
Independence 
MINA SAID* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the realm of international law, states reign. Consequently, the 
possible birth of a new state or the division of an existing one is a 
cataclysmic event that, for international law, is akin to the birth or death 
of a star in the cosmos. Both engender consequences, both in space and 
time, far broader than the creation or division of the entity itself. The 
importance of the subject necessitates, therefore, clarity to temper the 
chaos, instability, and uncertainty inherent in international relations. 
Yet, despite this immediate need, uncertainty continues to permeate the 
rules governing the creation of new states. This uncertainty is 
exacerbated by the fact that the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
judicial arm of the United Nations, declines to provide an authoritative 
answer even when called upon to do so.
1
 But now, the question lingers 
before the eye of the law once again. Greenland’s current struggle for 
independence from the Kingdom of Denmark brings the concepts of 
statehood, sovereignty, self-determination, and secession forward. The 
international legal community should therefore seize this opportunity to 
crystallize the jurisprudence controlling unilateral secession, self-
determination, and the creation of states. This discussion takes a step 
towards that goal. 
The journey begins with Greenland’s emergence as a Danish 
colony and its subsequent decolonization and integration within the 
Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland’s colonial era began, for all intents 
 
*   J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, B.A. Philosophy, University of California, Riverside. 
The author thanks Professor Cesare Romano for inspiring the subject of this article and the 
editors and staff of Loyola Law School’s International & Comparative Law Review for their 
invaluable input. 
 1. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22) [hereinafter ICJ Advisory 
Opinion re: Kosovar Independence].  
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and purposes, in 1721 in an attempt to root out paganism and introduce 
Lutheran Christianity.
2
 Since then, Danish control over the Greenlandic 
territory and its people took a variety of forms.
3
 Beginning in 1970, 
however, the “road to home rule” began as Denmark steadily conceded 
power to Greenlandic authorities over a number of decades.
4
 This has 
culminated into the Act on Greenland Self-Government, which came 
into force on June 21, 2009.
5
 Specific provisions of the Act are 
discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this discussion. For 
now, it suffices to note that immediately beginning with the preamble, 
the Act invokes international law. From the outset, the preamble 
recognizes the people of Greenland as “a people pursuant to 
international law with the right of self-determination.”
6
 The Act also 
declares Greenlandic to be the official language in Greenland.
7
 The 
purpose of the Act, according to Greenland’s Statsministeriet, “has been 
to facilitate the transfer of additional authority and thus responsibility to 
Greenlandic authorities . . . .”
8
  
The most significant part of the Act, entitled “Greenland’s Access 
to Independence,” emerges from these specific provisions.
9
 Although 
this section expresses Denmark’s current willingness to release its hold 
upon Greenland, the agreement has no value in terms of international 
law. Regardless of how hopeful the prospects may seem for Greenland, 
the Act remains merely an agreement between a sovereign state and its 
constituent—essentially, a domestic agreement. The Act confers no 
internationally enforceable obligation on Denmark to grant 
independence to Greenland; therefore, the principal mission lies in 
determining what, if any, rights the people of Greenland have under 
international law to exercise self-determination through a unilateral 
declaration of independence from Denmark. 
This note stands for the proposition that under public international 
law, Greenland remains without an absolute right to exercise self-
determination through a unilateral declaration of independence from 
Denmark for three reasons. First, a state’s right to unilaterally declare 
independence has, in the past, arisen only after the international 
community acknowledged the presence of both (1) a deprivation of the 
right to internal self-determination, and (2) systematic violations of 
 
 2. AXEL KJAER SØRENSEN, DENMARK-GREENLAND IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 11 
(2006). 
 3. See generally id. at 11-141. 
 4. Id. at 142. 
 5. Act on Greenland Self-Government, Act no. 473 of June 12, 2009 (Den.), available at 
http://www.stm.dk/multimedia/GR_Self-Government_UK.doc [hereinafter Self-Government Act 
no. 473]. 
 6. Id. at Preamble. 
 7. Id. ¶ 20; “Statsministeriet” is the Danish word for Prime Minister’s Office. 
 8. The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement, STATSMINISTERIET, 
http://www.stm.dk/_p_13090.html (last visited July 10, 2014).  
 9. Self-Government Act no. 473, supra note 5, ¶ 21. 
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human rights. Second, Denmark has neither deprived Greenland’s 
indigenous population of its right to internal self-determination, and nor 
has it committed any systematic violations of human rights. Lastly, 
these requirements are necessary to preserve international law’s 
preoccupation with stability and predictability. 
Accordingly, the discussion below will proceed in the following 
manner: the first section discusses the Greenlandic population’s status 
as “a people” pursuant to international law, Greenland’s colonial 
relationship under Denmark, and Greenland’s steady accumulation of 
autonomy up to its current self-government status; the second section 
explores the legal issues that would surround a unilateral declaration of 
independence by Greenland and discusses significant incidents in 
history where similar legal concepts applied; the third section applies 
the relevant legal concepts, in conjunction with their application to 
previous independence movements, to Greenland’s current predicament 
in order to ascertain whether or not international law would recognize a 
right in Greenland to unilaterally declare independence and explores, 
from a policy perspective, the justifications proffered in favor of 
Greenlandic independence and will conclude with a refutation thereof; 
lastly, the article concludes with a discussion surveying other legal 
problems that might arise were Greenland to achieve independence 
through an agreement with Denmark. 
II. THE PEOPLE OF GREENLAND 
Any discussion about self-determination, secession, or 
independence must begin by identifying its principal object, its main 
beneficiary, and its main character—a people. The reason for this lies in 
the fact that the right to self-determination, which will be discussed at 
length below, does not belong to states, international organizations, or 
governments; it belongs to the people.
10
 The definition of a people is 
relatively specific. A people, under international law, is  
[A] group of persons living in a given country or locality, 
having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own 
and united by this identity of race, religion, language and 
traditions in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to 
preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, 
ensuring the instruction and upbringing of their children in 
accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and 
rendering mutual assistance to each other.
11
 
In other words, “a people” is a group of persons united by a 
common nationality or ethnicity, religion, and language who value the 
 
 10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2200A(XXI) (Dec.16, 1966). 
 11. Johan D. Van Der Vyver, Self-Determination of the Peoples of Quebec Under 
International Law, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L  L. & POL’Y 1, 18 (2000). 
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preservation of that which unifies them.
12
  
There is little doubt that Greenland’s population bears the marks of 
a people. The present-day indigenous Inuit population traces its 
presence in Greenland as far back as 4000-5000 years,
13
 and more 
directly, to the last Eskimo migration of the Thule culture in the year 
800 A.D.
14
 Greenland’s current population is about 89% indigenous 
Inuit.
15
 The population has in recent times even more resolutely asserted 
its identity as Inuit.
16
 For example, locations and streets that once bore 
Danish titles in Greenland now bear Inuit names.
17
 “Inuit languages are 
[also] being promoted, and there is renewed focus on Inuit culture and 
traditions.”
18
 Greenlandic, a “polysynthetic language [that] belongs to 
the Eskimo-Aleutic languages,” is currently Greenland’s primary 
official language.
19
 The people of Greenland are united as well in 
religious confession as Protestant Christians.
20
  
With all this evidencing that the people of Greenland are united by 
a common nationality and ethnicity, religion, and language, there is 
little room to dispute their status as a people pursuant to international 
law. As a people, Greenland’s population has the right to self-
determination; the scope of this right and the extent to which a people 
may exercise it to break away from an oppressive state, however, is 
limited to the direst of circumstances.  
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Identifying a group as a people is only the first step in determining 
its right to exercise external self-determination. Whether a people is 
entitled to unilaterally secede from a mother state is largely a question 
of fact. The answer hinges upon the extent to which the group had been 
historically deprived, in a systematic way, of its right to internal self-
determination and its right to exist as itself in all its uniqueness, richness 
of culture, and cohesiveness. Understanding Greenland’s desire for 
independence therefore demands an overview of Greenland’s 
relationship with its parent state, Denmark. 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Greenland’s Culture and History, GREENLANDHOLIDAY.COM, 
http://www.greenlandexplored.com/AboutGreenland/InuitCulture (last visited July 10, 2014).  
 14. Facts on Greenland, GREENLAND REPRESENTATION TO THE EU, BRUSSELS, 
http://eu.nanoq.gl/Emner/About%20Greenland/Facts%20on%20Greenland.aspx (last visited July 
10, 2013). 
 15. The World Factbook: Greenland, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_gl.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).  
 16. Andy Rugg, Decline of Norse a lesson for modern Greenland, COPENHAGEN POST (Dec. 
3, 2011) http://cphpost.dk/news/decline-of-norse-a-lesson-for-modern-greenland.178.html. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Facts on Greenland, supra note 14. 
 20. Id. 
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A. Greenland as a Danish Colony—The Eviction of the Thule Tribe 
Fighters for Greenlandic independence cite the forced eviction of 
the Thule tribe from its home as proof of Denmark’s historic dominance 
over, and denial of the right of internal self-determination to, the 
indigenous people of Greenland. Therefore, It is necessary to investigate 
this specific incident. The story of Greenland’s colonial history began in 
1721
21
 when Danish settlers landed near present-day Nuuk.
22
 From that 
time until the middle of the nineteenth century, the people of Greenland 
governed themselves only in a limited capacity; the responsibility of 
governing lay almost entirely in the hands of Denmark.
23
 The Thule 
tribe, an Inuit people that lived in northwest Greenland from about 2000 
B.C., depended solely on hunting and fishing for their subsistence and 
lived completely isolated until 1818.
24
 In 1909, a Danish polar 
researcher established a commercial trading station in Greenland and 
began to colonize the area, calling it the Thule District.
25
 
During World War II, Denmark agreed to permit the United States 
to establish military bases and meteorological stations on Greenland. In 
1946, the United States built a weather station in the Thule District; 
after the war in 1951, the United States and Denmark then concluded a 
treaty on the defense of Greenland.
26
 Denmark had allowed the United 
States to established an air base “amidst the applicants’ [Inuit] hunting 
areas and in the vicinity of the [Inuit’s] native village site, Uummannaq 
(then called Thule).”
27
 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
acknowledges as common knowledge that the installation of the air base 
and the activities conducted thereon increasingly restricted the Thule 
tribe’s access to hunting and fishing, which had “a detrimental effect on 
the wildlife in the area.”
28
 
In the spring of 1953, Denmark further permitted the United States 
to establish an anti-aircraft artillery unit and expand the base to cover 
the entire land of the Thule tribe.
29
 As a result, the Thule tribe was 
evicted on May 25, 1953 albeit having “received more cash than they 
 
 21. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
Information received from Governments Denmark and Greenland, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.19/2009/4/Add.4, ¶ 2 (May 2009) [hereinafter U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-
Government Commission]. 
 22. Timeline: Greenland, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1023448.stm (last 
updated Jan. 10, 2012). 
 23. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, supra note 21, ¶ 2. 
 24. Hingitaq 53 v. Denmark, App. No. 18584/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2006), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-72219 (pagination refers to PDF file 
accessible on the cited webpage). 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 3. 
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had ever before seen in their lives.”
30
 Within a few days, the twenty-six 
Inuit families “left Uummannaq, leaving behind their houses, a hospital, 
a school, a radio station, warehouses, a church and a graveyard (the 
family houses were later burned down and the church was moved to 
another village on the west coast).”
31
 After taking its case to the ECHR 
in 2004,
32
 the Thule tribe’s appeal was ultimately rejected.
33
 
B. Greenland’s Expanding Autonomy 
In contrast to the picture painted by the Thule tribe’s eviction, in 
the middle of the nineteenth century, Denmark began steadily allowing 
the Greenlandic population to administer local matters through elected 
councils.
34
 Nevertheless, Greenland remained a non-self governing 
territory under Chapter XI of the UN Charter.
35
 Thus, from 1945-1954, 
Denmark was required to periodically submit reports about Greenland’s 
status to the decolonization bodies of the UN.
36
 By 1953, “Greenland 
was annexed as a Danish county,” and its colonial status was formally 
abolished.
37
 
As discussed below, Greenland’s integration with Denmark carries 
a significant implication. Colonies are generally entitled to exercise 
their right to external self-determination;
38
 if they so choose, they may 
break off from the colonial power that exercised dominion over them. 
The fact that the international community, through the UN General 
Assembly, recognized Greenland as an integral part of Denmark, 
however, disqualifies the people of Greenland from appealing to their 
former colonial status as the sole basis upon which it may assert a right 
to secede. 
Nevertheless, at this point, a significant wrinkle enters the story. 
Although Denmark held a referendum on the annexation of Greenland 
for its own people, no referendum took place in Greenland.
39
 The 
absence of the voice of the people of Greenland complicates the 
defining of Greenland’s current colonial status. If it is a colony, it is 
entitled to exercise its right to external self-determination through any 
means it desires. If it is no longer a colony, external self-determination 
 
 30. Jonathan D. Greenberg, The Arctic in World Environmental History, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L. L. 1307, 1369 (2009). 
 31. Hingitaq 53, Eur. Ct. H.R., supra note 24, at 3. 
 32. Stephen Frottrell, Inuit survival battle against US base, BBC NEWS (May 27, 2004), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3753677.stm. 
 33. Hingitaq 53, Eur. Ct. H.R., supra note 24, at 20. 
 34. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, supra note 21, ¶¶ 
2-3. 
 35. Id. ¶ 4. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Naja Dyrendom Graugaard, National Identity in Greenland in the Age of Self-
Government 13 (Ctr. for the Critical Study of Global Power and Politics, Working Paper No. 
CSGP 09/5, 2008).  
 38. See infra § IV(B). 
 39. Graugaard, supra note 37, at 13. 
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is available only through agreement with Denmark. This concern is 
addressed below, but its ability to influence the outcome of the present 
discussion necessitates bringing it forward here. It is sufficient at this 
point in the story to remark that by 1954, Denmark was no longer 
required to submit these reports because the UN General Assembly 
recognized “Greenland’s integration into the Kingdom of Denmark.”
40
  
Contrary to the aims of decolonization, this period of integration 
was, as far as the Greenlandic population was concerned, marred by a 
period of “Danization” characterized by “assimilation policy, birth-
place criteria, undermining of the Greenlandic language, [and] the 
growing Danish physical presence in leading positions.”
41
 Ironically, 
this “led to a growing Greenlandic consciousness of belonging to a 
distinct ethnic group” and precipitated the rise of nationalist movements 
and a revival of Inuit political awareness during the 1960s and 1970s.
42
 
Eventually, in 1973, a Home Rule Committee was set up internally 
“for the purpose of considering the possibility of establishing a Home 
Rule Arrangement within the framework of the unity of the Realm.”
43
 
On May 1, 1979, the Greenland Home Rule Arrangement (Home Rule) 
came into force after being adopted, first by the Danish Parliament, and 
then by the people of Greenland.
44
 One author characterized this period 
of Home Rule as a process of “Greenlandizing”
45
 in reaction to the 
“Danization” of the 1950s up until the establishment of the Home 
Rule.
46
 Thus, the policies of the Home Rule government focused on, 
inter alia, “expanding the use of the Greenlandic language, extending 
support to the Greenlandic cultural life, [and] replacing Danish workers 
with Greenlanders.”
47
 
After Home Rule had been in effect for 20 years, the Home Rule 
government had assumed a great deal of legislative and executive power 
and was responsible for “Greenland’s internal administration, direct and 
indirect taxes, the established church, fishing in the territory, hunting, 
agriculture and reindeer breeding, social welfare, labour market affairs, 
education and cultural affairs, vocational education, other matters 
relating to trade, health services, the housing area and protection of the 
environment.”
48
 
Because Greenland had assumed all the power it could assume 
under the 1979 Home Rule Arrangement, the Greenland government 
recognized “a need for revising Greenland’s position within the unity of 
 
 40. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, supra note 21, ¶ 4. 
 41. Graugaard, supra note 37, at 14. 
 42. Id. at 14-15. 
 43. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, supra note 21, ¶ 6 
(emphasis added). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Graugaard, supra note 37, at 15-16. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, supra note 21, ¶ 7. 
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the Realm.”
49
 Thereafter, the Greenlandic government set up another 
Home Rule Commission, which recommended that Greenland’s 
parliament set up a joint Greenland-Danish commission.
50
 
On June 21, 2004, the Danish Prime Minister and the Greenlandic 
Premier signed the terms necessary to establish the Greenland-Danish 
Self-Government Commission.
51
 The Commission’s purpose was to 
“submit draft legislation regarding a self-government arrangement for 
Greenland.”
52
 This commission, however, did not have free reign in 
accomplishing its purpose. Its agreements were to remain within 
specific parameters. These parameters required the new self-government 
arrangement “to be placed ‘within the framework of the existing unity 
of the Realm’ and take its ‘point of departure in Greenland’s present 
constitutional position,’ namely the existing Danish Constitution.”
53
 In 
other words, whatever responsibilities the new self-government 
authorities would be permitted to assume, they would not include any 
assumption of power over “the Constitution, foreign affairs, defence and 
security policy, the Supreme Court, nationality, and exchange rate and 
monetary policy” of Denmark.
54
 The Danish Constitution was to remain 
the supreme law of the land and its Supreme Court would supersede any 
Greenlandic local courts.
55
 Additionally, the Danish government was to 
have sole authority over Greenland’s foreign affairs, defense, and 
security policy.
56
 It is important to make apparent, however, that even 
though Denmark officially reigned over Greenland’s foreign affairs, the 
Home Rule Government of Greenland actively participated in 
international agreements even prior to the Act on Greenland Self-
Government.
57
 Therefore, the new self-government arrangement, in 
essence, would already have wide latitude in arranging Greenland’s 
domestic affairs despite power remaining to the Kingdom of Denmark.  
 
 
 49. Id. ¶ 8.  
 50. Id. ¶ 9. 
 51. The Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission’s Report on Self-Government in 
Greenland: Executive Summary, ARCTIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT, 2008, at 3, 
http://www.arcticgovernance.org/getfile.php/953432.1529.dwfvyfwtyy/Report+on+Self-
Government+in+Greenland+-+Executive+Summary.pdf.  
 52. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, supra note 21, ¶ 
15. 
 53. Id. ¶ 16. 
 54. Id. ¶ 7. 
 55. Id. ¶ 24. 
 56. Id. 
 57. International legal framework, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/propositions-and-reports/reports-to-the-
storting/2011-2012/meld-st-7-20112012-2/5.html?id=697752 (“In 2006 an agreement was 
concluded between Norway and Denmark together with the Home Rule Government of 
Greenland on the delimitation of the continental shelf and the fisheries zones in the area between 
Greenland and Svalbard”) (emphasis added). 
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C. The Act on Greenland Self-Government 
The work of the commission ultimately culminated in The Act on 
Greenland Self-Government, which came into force on June 21, 2009.
58
 
This agreement between Greenland and Denmark contains four 
provisions that are relevant here. First, it recognizes the people of 
Greenland as indeed a people under international law entitled to self-
determination.
59
 Second, it officially establishes Greenlandic as 
Greenland’s official language.
60
 Third, it provides Greenland with a 
greater degree of responsibility in a number of new fields such as: 
“administration of justice, including the establishment of courts of law; 
the prison and probation service; the police; the field relating to 
company law, accounting and auditing; mineral resource activities; 
aviation; law of legal capacity, family law and succession law; aliens 
and border controls; the working environment; as well as financial 
regulation and supervision.”
61
 Lastly, it offers the possibility of 
Greenlandic independence subject to agreement with Denmark.
62
 
Indeed, because the principal purpose of the Self-Government Act was 
“to facilitate the transfer of additional authority and thus responsibility 
to Greenlandic authorities,”
63
 the Self-Government Act nevertheless 
represents a significant step towards full Greenlandic self-governance. 
IV. LEGAL CONCEPTS: STATEHOOD, SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-
DETERMINATION, AND SECESSION 
Greenland’s quest for independence means that it desires 
statehood. This desire, however, stands directly at odds with Denmark’s 
identity as a sovereign state. Intuitively speaking, if a particular state is 
truly sovereign—in the literal sense of the word—over its people and its 
land, then it follows that only that state can decide whether or not to 
give up a portion of that over which it is sovereign.
64
 But, in 
International Law, two conflicting yet necessary concepts exist. On the 
one hand, the concept of a state and its sovereignty serves to preserve 
the integrity and stability of the international community because states 
are the actors in international law.
65
 On the other hand, human rights, 
 
 58. Self-Government Act no. 473, supra note 5. 
 59. Id. at Preamble. 
 60. Id. ¶ 20. 
 61. The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement, supra note 8. 
 62. Self-Government Act no. 473, supra note 5, ¶ 21.  
 63. The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement, supra note 8. 
 64. Sovereignty literally means “supreme dominion, authority, or rule.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available at Westlaw BLACKS: Sovereignty; see also Taiaiake 
Alfred, From Sovereignty to Freedom: Towards an Indigenous Political Discourse, INDIGENOUS 
AFFAIRS 22 (2001) (defining sovereignty as “supreme political authority, independent and 
unlimited by any other power.”). 
 65. See U.N. Secretary-General, Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen the 
rule of law at the national and international levels, Summary, U.N. Doc. A/66/749 (Mar. 16, 
2012) [hereinafter Delivering justice] (“[R]espect for the rule of law at the international and 
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consisting in a separate body of law entirely, presumably serve to 
protect persons, peoples, and their dignity. 
 
A. Statehood and Sovereignty 
 
In order to better understand Greenland’s goal, it is necessary to 
understand what it means to be a state and why statehood is so coveted 
around the world. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights 
and Duties of States defines a state as “a person of international law 
[that possesses] a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) 
government; and d) [the] capacity to enter into relations with the other 
states.”
66
 Once a state satisfies this definition, it acquires a defining 
characteristic, namely, sovereignty—the ever-coveted perk of becoming 
a state. Although a precise definition of sovereignty is difficult to come 
by, general consensus recognizes that it at least describes a state’s 
possession of “supreme power and authority relating to a body politic 
that is territorially determined or determinable.”
67
 The concept of 
sovereignty also means that “the territorial integrity and political 
independence of the State are inviolable” and that “[e]very state has an 
inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural 
systems, without interference in any form by another State.”
68
  
Practically speaking, this means that a sovereign state has control 
over its people, its territory, its manner of government, and is an equal 
participant in the international arena—equal even to those states 
wielding the most “subjective” power.
69
 Attaining statehood is, 
therefore, an alluring proposition. Within the framework of an already 
existing state however, a people’s desire for independence stands 
directly against the supreme and inviolable dominion of the state from 
which it seeks independence. However, because self-determination is 
also considered a human right, it is therefore necessary to carve out the 
right balance between the interests of a people and the interests of a 
sovereign state. 
 
national levels is central to ensuring the predictability and legitimacy of international relations, 
and for delivering just outcomes in the daily life of all individuals.”). 
 66. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 
3097, U.N.T.S. 881 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]; see also Jianming Shen, Sovereignty, 
Statehood, Self-Determination, and the Issue of Taiwan, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1101, 1126 
(2000) (explaining that these requirements cannot be considered individually and in a vacuum. 
Instead, “they relate to and find definition in one another [such that] a putative state must possess 
a government that, itself, governs a population within a specified territory and that, itself, has the 
capacity to enter into foreign relations”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Winston P. Nagan & Aitza M. Haddad, Sovereignty in Theory and Practice, 13 SAN 
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 429, 436-37 (2012). 
 68. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dda1f104.html. 
 69. See generally UN General Assembly, Functions and Powers of the General Assembly, 
available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2013) 
[hereinafter Functions and Powers of the General Assembly].  
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B. Self-determination 
The right to self-determination, as expressed by modern 
secessionist movements, appears on its face to be antithetical to the 
principles of statehood and sovereignty; this therefore warrants 
reconciliation of the two. Hundreds of secessionist movements are 
active in various communities around the world,
70
 and these secessionist 
movements “almost invariably claim legitimacy for their cause on the 
basis of the international law principle proclaiming the right to self-
determination of peoples.”
71
 The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations 
defines the right of self-determination in the following way: 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without 
external interference, their political status and to pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development, and every State has 
the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions 
of the Charter.
72
 
One of the ways in which a people may implement its right to self-
determination is through “the establishment of a sovereign and 
independent State, the free association or integration with an 
independent State or the emergence into any other political status.”
73
 
However, The Declaration of Friendly Relations, after discussing the 
obligations of states to preserve and promote the right of self-
determination of its peoples, provides an important qualification to that 
right: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus 
possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed 
or colour.
74
 
These provisions reveal three important characteristics of self-
determination. First, every state must respect its peoples’ right to 
determine their own political, economic, and cultural development. 
Second, a people may implement its right to self-determination through 
independence, secession, or integration. Third, if a state complies with 
its obligations to respect the right of self-determination of its peoples, 
 
 70. Van Der Vyver, supra note 11, at 1.  
 71. Id. 
 72. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 68.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
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then a people may not take any action antagonistic to the territorial 
integrity or political unity of the sovereign state in which it exists.  
From the juxtaposition of the second and third characteristics, it 
necessarily follows that a people’s ability to implement its right to self-
determination through secession is limited. Therefore, the question 
becomes: if all peoples have an inherent right to self-determination, 
what is the scope of that right? The resolution rests in recognizing two 
sub-types of self-determination: (1) the right to internal self-
determination, and (2) the right to external self-determination.
75
 
Understanding and distinguishing these two sides of self-
determination is key to a reasoned analysis with respect to Greenland’s 
capacity to seek unilateral secession. Internal self-determination 
consists of “a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and 
cultural development within the framework of an existing state.”
76
 It is 
the most common vehicle through which peoples fulfill their right to 
self-determination.
77
  
On the other hand, external self-determination consists in either 
“the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free 
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence 
into any other political status.”
78
 With respect to the Greenlandic people, 
external self-determination would arise as a claim to the right to 
unilateral secession. Theoretically, the external exercise of self-
determination arises from the fact that a “state that gravely violates its 
obligations towards a distinct people or community within its 
boundaries loses the legitimacy to rule over that people.”
79
 Thus, the 
external right “arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, 
under carefully defined circumstances.”
80
 According to the UN 
Declaration on Friendly Relations, these circumstances include 
subjecting people to “alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” as 
well as a parent state denying a people their “fundamental human 
rights.
81
 Additionally, the external right may arise upon a “direct or 
indirect violation of the right of internal self-determination, exhaustion 
of effective judicial remedies; and realistic political arrangements for 
the realization of internal self-determination.”
82
  
In short, external self-determination is meant as a last resort. The 
situation on the ground must be as dire as the denial of fundamental 
human rights. Not only that, but even in the face of such oppression, the 
oppressed population must exhaust every possible judicial and political 
 
 75. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 282 (Can.) (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 68, at 9.  
 79. John B. Henriksen, Implementation of the Right of Self-Determination of Indigenous 
Peoples, INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 6, 9-10 (2001). 
 80. Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 75, at 282. 
 81. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 68. 
 82. Joshua Castellino, Book Review, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 791, 794 (2005). 
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solution to secure its right to internal self-determination within the 
framework of the existing state. On their face, these requirements 
express international law’s bias toward state sovereignty even at the 
expense of the rights of a people. As discussed below, however, this 
bias is necessary in order to maintain a stable system of international 
law in which states are the principal actors. 
C. Remedial Secession 
Because secession is one expression of external self-determination, 
the extremely limited circumstances under which peoples may invoke 
that right implies that there is no universal right of peoples to secede 
from a state.
83
  Secession is by no means illegal,
84
 but because it is in the 
interest of a state and its sovereignty not to create precedent with 
respect to the subject, international law has not yet solidified the proper 
conditions under which a people may secede.
85
 Also, if a people had a 
universal right to secede, “the ensuing mass fragmentation could 
undermine peace and security . . . creat[ing] 5,000 countries.”
86
 This 
result would be unfavorable, and more importantly, antithetical to the 
main principle of international law as the basis for worldwide peace and 
stability.
87
  
One author even opines that even if secession is an option based 
upon the oppressive circumstances that allows a people to invoke its 
right to external self-determination, 
[T]he right to secession may be unwarranted if the state stops 
the discrimination and institutes legal remedies. In absence of 
concrete evidence showing human rights violations, and denial 
of participation in government rising to the point of calling into 
question the state’s territorial integrity, alternate modes of self- 
determination compatible with territorial integrity should be 
exercised. They may include enhanced local self-government 
in a demographic area, or union with confirmation of territorial 
unity.
88
 
Therefore, although “self-determination is universal, its remedial 
aspect applies in limited instances.”
89
 Discerning which instances those 
are requires applying the discussion on external self-determination, 
above, to the discussion of historical precedents, below. 
 
 83. See generally Wojciech Kornacki, When Minority Groups Become “People” Under 
International Law, 25 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 59 (2012). 
 84. See generally id. at 9. 
 85. See generally id. at 8. 
 86. See generally id. at 9. 
 87. International Law, SWITZ. FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, available at 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2014). 
 88. Kornacki, supra note 83, at 89. 
 89. Id. at 83.  
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V. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS 
A concrete definition of the limited instances in which a people 
may invoke its right to remedial secession requires harmonizing the 
ways in which the international community has applied this right in 
different circumstances. Since each circumstance is emphatically 
unique, the international community has had difficulty articulating a 
consistent and coherent rule upon which future secessionist movements 
and their antagonists may rely upon. By comparing and contrasting the 
following movements, a coherent rule should emerge. 
A. Kosovo 
One of the most significant secessionist movements in recent 
history was Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. When the 
ICJ attempted to examine the legality of this declaration, it asked 
whether “the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo [is] in accordance with 
international law?”
90
 At first glance, it would appear that the ICJ was 
finally going to articulate a standard defining the inner and outer 
boundaries of the right to a unilateral declaration of independence. This, 
unfortunately, was not the case.  
Limiting the scope of its decision, the ICJ emphasized that the 
answer turned not on whether “international law conferred a positive 
entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to declare its independence” or 
“whether international law generally confers an entitlement on entities 
situated within a State unilaterally to break away from it.”
91
 Instead, the 
ICJ chose only to decide, “whether or not the applicable international 
law prohibited the declaration of independence.”
92
 By deciding this way, 
the ICJ did not officially address the extent to which international law 
confers a right on a people within a state to unilaterally secede.  
Of particular importance is the ICJ’s analysis of “general 
international law.” The ICJ observed that state practice during the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries clearly pointed “to 
the conclusion that international law contained no prohibition of 
declarations of independence.”
93
 Therefore, its final conclusion was no 
more than recognition that general international law did not prohibit 
declarations of independence. The ICJ did not discuss whether or not an 
affirmative right to declare independence vis-à-vis a right to self-
determination exists. 
On its face, it appears that the narrowness of this decision renders 
it insignificant when applied to broader contexts. This may have even 
 
 90. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Power of General Assembly to Request Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403.  
 91. Id. at 426. 
 92. Id. at 425. 
 93. Id. at 436. 
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been the court’s intention, given that a decision either finding or 
denying an affirmative right to declare independence would have 
provoked far-reaching consequences.
94
 Nevertheless, when examined 
within the context in which it arose, the decision remains instructive as 
a weighty data point in the present discussion’s attempt to identify a 
common trend among various secessionist movements. This assertion is 
only bolstered by the fact that separatist movements around the world 
have relied and continued to rely on this decision for inspiration for 
their own cause.
95
 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia 
emerged out of a “tumultuous history.”
96
 Concurrently with the 
“Albanianisation of Kosovo,” the Yugoslav constitution explicitly 
recognized Kosovo as an autonomous province, consequently launching 
a Kosovar campaign for recognition as a republic.
97
 This progress 
towards independence, however, was short-lived; in 1989, the 
vehemently nationalistic Serbian-led regime of the Yugoslav Federation 
“began to abolish Kosovo’s autonomy” after vilifying the Albanians as 
a people.
98
 Despite seeking a peaceful solution to achieve self-
determination, the Albanians faced systematic oppression, murder, 
unlawful imprisonment, torture, and mass expulsion from jobs at the 
hands of the Serbian regime.
99
 Chaos ensued. Serbian oppression of the 
Albanians escalated to bona fide “ethnic cleansing” against Albanian 
civilians “under the pretext of hunting” down members of the emerging 
guerilla warfare-based Kosovo Liberation Army.
100
 The situation was so 
dire that NATO “bombed targets in Yugoslavia” in a seventy-eight day 
campaign justified as “necessary to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.”
101
  
Immediately after Kosovo declared independence, “the USA, 
France, Costa Rica, Turkey, Afghanistan, Albania and the United 
 
 94. See Bart M. J. Szewczyk, Lawfulness of Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, AM. 
SOC. INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/issue/27/lawfulness-kosovos-declaration-independence 
(“the Court’s opinion potentially could unsettle a stable political situation and lead to adverse 
consequences.”); Richard Caplan, The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, 55 U.S. INST. OF 
PEACE BRIEF 1, 2 (Sept. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB55%20The%20ICJs%20Advisory%20Opinion%20on%20
Kosovo.pdf (“the narrowness of the Court’s response meant that the Court did not weigh in on 
larger questions … [T]hat might have had some bearing on . . . other [independence] contests.”). 
 95. Caplan, supra note 94.  
 96. Daniel Fierstein, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: an Incident Analysis of 
Legality, Policy, and Future Implications, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 419 (2008). 
 97. See James Summers, Kosovo: From Yugoslav Province to Disputed Independence, in 
KOSOVO: A PRECEDENT? THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY OPINION AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 5-8 (James 
Summers ed., 2011). 
 98. Besfort Rrecaj, The Kosovo Conundrum, in KOSOVO: A PRECEDENT? THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY OPINION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 115-16 (James Summers ed., 2011). 
 99. Id. at 116. 
 100. Id. at 121. 
 101. Summers, supra note 97, at 18. 
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Kingdom,” states that had formally recognized the Republic of Kosovo 
“recognized it for more than what was actually declared: an independent 
and fully sovereign State”—a sentiment now shared by 109 UN 
Member States.
102
 The immediate, widespread, and continuing 
recognition of the legitimacy of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence, even before the ICJ decision, strongly suggests an 
emerging customary international law supported by the requisite state 
practice in conjunction with opinio juris.
103
  
The purpose of going through the details of Kosovo’s violent 
history leading up to its unilateral secession is to demonstrate that 
Greenland’s quest for independence is in many ways distinguishable 
from that of Kosovo. First, as its history reveals, Kosovo declared 
independence in an environment characterized by tumult, disharmony, 
hatred, ethnic cleansing, violence, extreme discrimination, and war. The 
Albanians of Kosovo were not a people whose culture was respected, 
humanity was honored, or identity as a people was celebrated. On the 
contrary, they were persecuted as a people. As one author puts it, 
“Serbian atrocities directed exclusively at Albanians showed a clear 
intention to eliminate them from Kosovo” and satisfied “the definition 
of genocide in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”
104
 Therefore, even if the ICJ 
declined to consider whether the people of Kosovo had a right to 
unilaterally secede, an almost universal recognition of its independent 
status allows Kosovo to be the quintessential icon of a people possessed 
of the right to unilaterally secede. 
Greenland’s history, in contrast, contains no analogous episodes of 
ethnic cleansing, violence, or even the slightest military involvement.
105
 
 
 102. Rrecaj, supra note 98, at 129; Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State? 
KOSOVO THANKS YOU, http://www.kosovothanksyou.com (last visited Aug. 6, 2014). 
 103. See Rebecca Crootof, Constitutional Convergence and Customary International Law, 54 
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 195, 197 (2013) (“Under the classic or ‘traditional’ theory of customary 
international law, a norm attains binding status if the general and consistent practice of states 
demonstrates that the norm is accepted as law by the world community. State practice provides 
evidence of custom, while opinio juris—the conviction that a norm is legally binding—states the 
‘attitudinal requirement.’”). 
 104. Besfort Rrecaj, Paper, The Right to Self-Determination and Statehood: The Case of 
Kosovo, BEPRESS LEGAL SERIES 66 (2006); PREVENTING GENOCIDE, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL 
ADVISER ON THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/genocide_prevention.shtml (last accessed July 10, 
2014) (defining genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, including: Killing members of the group; 
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; Deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; Forcibly transferring children of 
the group to another group.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105. See Robert Petersen, Colonialism as Seen from a Former Colonized Area, ARCTIC 
CIRCLE (Oct. 25, 1992), http://arcticcircle.uconn.edu/HistoryCulture/petersen.html (explaining 
that “[i]n Greenland colonial history, we have no real history of oppression by force, as known 
for example in Latin America and many other places. Many of the latter examples are 
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This is not to discount or reduce the significance or infamy of 
Denmark’s expulsion of the Thule tribe from its home or even the 
Danization imposed upon it as it integrated into the Danish realm, but 
even those regrettable episodes of history pale in comparison to the 
violence that colored Kosovo’s birth as an independent state. Even 
when this violence and ethnic cleansing amounted to genocide, the ICJ 
remained hesitant to declare an affirmative right in an oppressed people 
to declare independence. This indicates that the recognition of a right to 
unilaterally secede must at least arise from an environment that, by 
virtue of how dire it is, necessitates the creation of a new state to 
prevent further chaos, loss of life, and abuses of human rights. Without 
such caution, chaos would ensue on the backs of sectarians unsatisfied 
with their governments in every corner of the world trying to achieve 
independence. Such a result is antithetical to both existing state 
sovereignty and the overarching legal principles of international law 
consisting in stability and predictability. 
B. Quebec 
The following question remains: must a people’s right to 
unilaterally secede always arise from an environment equally 
tumultuous and disastrous as that of Kosovo? In contrast to the 
Albanians of Kosovo, the people of Quebec have been, throughout 
recent history, unsuccessful in seeking independence from Canada. In 
fact, the question even reached the Supreme Court of Canada, which 
found no right to external self-determination in the people of Quebec. 
Its decision essentially centered around the lack of exceptional 
circumstances under which a people would be entitled to unilaterally 
secede from a parent state, namely, “where a people is oppressed, as for 
example under foreign military occupation; or where a definable group 
is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, 
economic, social and cultural development.”
106
 
Some may dismiss the Canadian high court’s decision as merely a 
self-interested declaration made by the high court of a country whose 
interest stands in opposition to Quebec’s. Its decision and underlying 
rationale, however, bears independent legal merit. Quebec’s quest for 
independence stands in sharp contrast to Kosovo’s. Insofar as Quebec 
encompasses a people with the right to self-determination, there exists 
no dispute. In fact, one author described Quebec as the quintessential 
“nation”—”if the term “nation” has any meaning.”
107
 Quebec’s 
 
characterized as internal colonialism, but military power was never used against Greenlanders, 
not even in the beginning.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 106. Secession of Quebec, supra note 75, at 287; see also supra Sections IV(B) and (C) 
(explaining in further detail the limited circumstances under which a people’s right to external 
self-determination activates). 
 107. Elaine Bernard, Quebec Sovereignty: Devolution the Solution, PEACE & DEMOCRACY 
35, 36 (1995). 
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inhabitants share a common language, culture, heritage, territorial 
integrity, legal system, and political structure separate and distinct from 
the rest of Canada.
108
 All the puzzle pieces seem to be in place: the 
people of Quebec are indeed a people and self-determination is a right 
that all peoples possess.  
Despite the presence of a people, however, the people of Quebec 
are actively and comfortably able to exercise their right to self-
determination internally and within the framework of an existing 
state.
109
 This stands in contrast to the Albanians of Kosovo, who were 
actively denied the right to exercise self-determination internally and 
within the framework of their existing state. It was only then, in this 
oppressed condition, did the right to exercise external self-determination 
activate in the people of Kosovo. This distinction is what is really at the 
heart of striking the correct balance between the very foundation of 
international law, state sovereignty, and the human right of self-
determination. 
VI. THE ABSENCE OF A RIGHT OF UNILATERAL SECESSION IN GREENLAND 
The discrepancy between Kosovo’s relationship to Serbia, on the 
one hand, and Quebec’s relationship to Canada, on the other, paints a 
relatively perspicuous picture of the extent to which a people’s right to 
internal self-determination must be denied in order to justify violating 
the sovereignty of a parent state through unilateral secession. If 
conceptualized as a spectrum, peoples in a situation closer to the 
Kosovar Albanians are more entitled to unilateral secession than are 
those in the more “comfortable” position of the Quebecoise. Having 
considered the relationship of both peoples to their respective parent 
states, it is not difficult to apprehend that Greenland’s relationship to 
Denmark mirrors Quebec’s relationship to Canada in a much more 
substantial way than Kosovo’s relationship to Serbia. 
Nevertheless, from a practical standpoint, apart from the 
constraints of international law, Greenland lies on the brink of 
independence.
110
 Several factors support this assertion. First, Denmark 
has already expressed its willingness to negotiate the possibility of full 
independence for Greenland.
111
 Second, Greenland itself is already 
contemplating potential relations with other states—an activity that is 
 
 108. See Canada Profile, BBC NEWS: US & CANADA, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-
canada-16841111 (last updated Apr. 23, 2014). 
 109. See Bernard, supra note 107, at 36 (although Bernard argues that Quebec’s identity as a 
nation entitles it to secede, ironically, it is this peaceful existence as the “quintessential nation” 
that forecloses any possibility of unilateral secession). 
 110. David A. Gabel, Mineral Rush in Greenland; Independence May be Around the Corner, 
ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS NETWORK (July 27, 2012),  
http://www.enn.com/enn_original_news/article/44723. 
 111. Self-Government Act no. 473, supra note 5.  
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part and parcel of being an independent, sovereign state.
112
 Furthermore, 
Greenland’s premier has declared unequivocally, that, “Greenland will 
be ‘one of three independent states’ in the North Atlantic.”
113
 This is not 
an outlandish remark, given that Greenland’s independence is now 
dependent almost entirely on achieving financial autonomy.
114
 Evidence 
suggests that it will not have a difficult time achieving such autonomy 
because countries such as the United States are “highly interested in 
investing in the resource base of the country and in tapping the vast 
expected hydrocarbons off the Greenlandic coast.”
115
 
Do these factors, though, somehow entitle the Greenlandic people 
to unilaterally secede without Denmark’s consent? No—mere 
practicality does not translate to “legal right.” The fact remains that 
Greenland’s nearness to achieving independence comes only at the 
pleasure of Denmark, its sovereign. As indicated above, Quebec can 
potentially function as its own state, practically speaking; yet it has no 
legal right to unilaterally secede from Canada because the right of its 
people to exist as itself has not been denied. Thus, after comparing 
Greenland’s position to that of Kosovo and Quebec, it is clear that the 
systematic denial of its people’s right to internal self-determination 
required to activate its right to external self-determination and justify 
violating Denmark’s inviolable sovereignty is simply not present.  
Nevertheless, several arguments exist in favor of Greenland having 
a right to unilaterally declare independence. The most convincing of 
these arguments is the proposition that Greenland, a former colony of 
Denmark, has not yet exercised, or is not permitted to exercise at all, its 
 
 112. See Xinhua News, Greenland warm to China’s involvement in Arctic, COPENHAGEN 
POST (Nov. 5, 2011), http://cphpost.dk/news/greenland-warm-to-chinas-involvement-in-
arctic.70.html; see also Spotlight on the Arctic at Brussel´s Cine-ONU, UNRIC (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://www.unric.org/en/latest-un-buzz/28146-spotlight-on-the-arctic-at-brusselas-cine-onu 
(indicating that “Greenland´s Prime Minister Kuupik Kleist has met such luminaries as the 
President of South-Korea, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton and EU Commission 
President José Manuel Barroso. Last, but not least, the Arctic and Greenland are understood to 
have been high on the agenda in the state visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Denmark in 
2012.”). 
 113. Greenland’s premier presents vision for 2050, NUNATSIAQ ONLINE (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674greenlands_premier_presents_his_vision_for_
greenland_in_2050/; see also Kuupik Kleist, Speech at the Seminar on Greenland and the Arctic, 
Greenland’s approach to EU’s Arctic Communication, GREENLAND REPRESENTATION TO THE 
EU, BRUSSELS (Oct. 29, 2009), available at 
http://eu.nanoq.gl/Emner/EuGl/~/media/CF10597313C04F94920CD8ACE17EDEB3.ashx (where 
Greenland’s premier boasts “we … have a landmass which can almost cover the entire European 
continent and a location which is now increasingly becoming a geostrategic centre of the world’s 
attention. If Europe is ready to listen to our concerns Greenland could become your Arctic 
window.”). 
 114. Kathrin Keil, U.S. Interests in Greenland – On a Path Towards Full Independence?, 
THE ARCTIC INST. CTR. FOR CIRCUMPOLAR SEC. STUD. (June 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2011/08/us-interest-will-us-help-greenland-to.html. 
 115. Id. 
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right to external self-determination.
116
 Understanding this argument 
requires a little bit of background. In the context of colonized peoples, 
the UN defines “self-determination” as the right of a colonized people 
or a dependent territory to “decide about the future status of [its] 
homeland.”
117
 After the UN recognized self-determination as a human 
right, some formerly colonized territories exercised that right by 
becoming independent while others “chose free association, or 
integration with an independent State.”
118
 The process by which these 
territories exercised their right to self-determination is known as 
decolonization.”
119
  
Currently, Greenland is neither a colony nor a non-self-governing 
territory. On June 5, 1953, Greenland was fully integrated into the 
Danish realm.
120
 An amendment to the Danish constitution made 
Greenland “a province represented by two members in Parliament.”
121
 
In this way, the people of Greenland “acquired the same rights and 
duties as other Danish citizens.”
122
 Greenland has therefore already 
undergone the process of decolonization.   
The question, though, is whether, through the process of 
decolonization, Greenland actually exercised its right to self-
determination. Answering this question is both central and 
determinative for the following reasons. If the people of Greenland have 
indeed exercised, and are exercising their right to self-determination 
through the process of decolonization and in its current mode of 
existence, then independence from Denmark is no longer an option 
outside of Denmark’s free consent or in the face of a denial of internal 
self-determination and human rights abuses by the sovereign. If, on the 
other hand, the people of Greenland have not yet exercised their right to 
self-determination in spite of the process of decolonization, then the 
people of Greenland have an absolute right to choose for themselves 
whether they want to secede from Denmark and become a sovereign 
state. 
One scholar contends that the people of Greenland did not exercise 
their right to self-determination when Greenland was integrated as a 
part of Denmark in 1953 and therefore remains entitled to unilaterally 
secede pursuant to their former colonial status.
123
 In support of his 
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assertion, six factors are cited, five of which are particularly relevant to 
the present discussion. First, he claims that Greenlanders did not have 
an opportunity to make a real choice as to their fate; they only had the 
choice between the status quo or integration.
124
 Second, he contends that 
the Greenlandic Provincial Council neither possessed sufficient time nor 
was given access to competent expertise before approving the proposal 
for integration created by an all-Danish Constitutional Commission.
125
 
Third, the author doubts the effectiveness of the Danish-created 
Provincial Council and maintains that it was not competent to take on 
the “immense task of deciding permanently on the constitutional future 
of Greenland” because the Danish government gave it only minimal 
power.
126
 Fourth, the author indicates that the people of Greenland did 
not participate in a referendum about whether to integrate or to seek 
independence.
127
 Lastly, the author indicates that East and North 
Greenland had no representatives.
128
 
Furthermore, the same argument identifies eight aspects in which 
Greenland is so distinct from Denmark as to constitute a separate 
political entity: geographically, ethnically, culturally, historically, 
judicially, politically, administratively, and economically.
129
 He argues 
that the existence of these factors makes it so that Greenland remains a 
colony still entitled to exercise the right to external self-
determination.
130
 This argument depends primarily on General 
Assembly Resolution 1541(XV), which provides guidelines that help 
determine whether or not a former colony has been decolonized through 
integration with its parent state, self-governance, or other permissible 
mechanism.
131
  
The author, however, misapplies and mischaracterizes Resolution 
1541 in a few critical ways. First, the aforementioned eight aspects do 
not necessitate or imply that the Greenlandic people are entitled to 
external self-determination. Rather, they are merely factors that may 
require the sovereign to transmit information to the UN regarding the 
progress of decolonization. This is only true where those factors place 
the territory in a position of subordination. To this effect, Principle V of 
Resolution 1541 characterizes a territory as a colony only where the 
elements “affect the relationship between the metropolitan State and the 
territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the latter in a 
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 131. G.A. Res. 1541(XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., at 29 (Dec. 15, 1960), available at 
http://daccess-dds-
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position or status of subordination.”
132
  
Moreover, the extent to which Greenland retains a unique 
character within the framework of another independent state does not 
mean that it is repressed in its attempt to exercise self-determination—
quite the contrary; this actually demonstrates that Denmark is doing 
what it should be doing—respecting the Greenlandic people’s right to 
internal self-determination. Greenland is only “subordinate” insofar as it 
exists within the framework of another sovereign state. This is not the 
sort of arbitrary subordination contemplated by Resolution 1541. In 
fact, several factors all point to Greenland’s status as an equal partner 
with Denmark and not a subordinate: (1) the Self-Government Act 
agreed upon by Greenland and Denmark; (2) its affirmance of 
Greenlandic as the official language; (3) its broad grant of power to 
Greenlandic authorities; (4) the supermajority of native Inuit; and, most 
powerfully, (5) Greenland’s participation in international dialogue 
concerning its own natural resources and the fact that it has already 
concluded agreements
133
 with other states. Thus, even if Greenland was 
once in a position of subordination—for instance, during the period of 
“Danization” or the forced relocation of the Thule tribe—Denmark has 
taken steps to remedy all, if any, denials of self-determination. Under 
these circumstances, in addition to the fact that Greenland’s relationship 
to Denmark is nowhere near that of Kosovo to Serbia, the Greenlandic 
people do not have a right to unilateral, remedial secession. 
VI. INTERNATIONAL POLICY DOES NOT SUPPORT A RIGHT TO 
UNILATERAL SECESSION IN GREENLAND 
Limiting the right of the people of Greenland to unilaterally secede 
from Denmark by the standards outlined above produces a curious and 
ironic result. The Greenlandic Inuit, no matter how linguistically and 
culturally distinct from the Danish, have no right to legally actualize 
their uniqueness through unilateral secession unless they somehow 
suffer under the hypothetical heavy hand of Denmark. Moreover, 
recognizing that Greenland does not have a right to unilateral secession 
is necessary to maintain international law’s preoccupation with stability 
and predictability. Understanding why requires weighing the right to 
self-determination against the concept of state sovereignty—the 
backbone of international law.  
Within each of a number of different sovereign states throughout 
the world, there exist multiple separatist movements, each asserting its 
 
 132. Id. 
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right as a people to self-determination.
134
 Intuitively speaking, chaos 
would ensue if Greenland had a right to unilaterally declare 
independence. Consider the following: if a right to unilateral secession 
existed in the Greenlandic people, the threshold would be at its lowest 
ebb. It would thus be relatively easy for any separatist movement that is 
politically, socially, religiously, and culturally distinct from the 
sovereign state in which it exists to “violate” the sovereignty of that 
state. That result, especially given the number of separatist movements 
currently in existence, would destroy the meaning and value of 
sovereignty and reduce it to a mere nullity. 
Additionally, it is impractical, at least at this point in time, for 
Greenland, in its current position of total and complete economic 
dependence on Denmark, to seek total independence instead of 
continuing to pursue self-determination within the framework of the 
Realm. Despite all of the potential wealth with which Greenland may be 
privy to from its vast mineral deposits and natural resources, 
independence by any mode is still only a mere potentiality. Moreover, 
the chairman of the Commission on Self-Government himself opined 
that  
“[a] country like Greenland, with its geographical location and 
with such a small population base, will always be dependent 
on other countries . . . . I believe that Greenland can preserve 
its greatest possible relative independence as long as the 
country is in a community of the realm with a small, militarily 
weak nation like Denmark.”
135
  
In other words, existing within the framework of Denmark may 
actually afford the Greenlandic people a greater opportunity to exercise 
self-determination than would the economic sacrifice that independence 
would demand.
136
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Having scrutinized, through the prism of international law, the 
possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence by the people of 
Greenland, it is apparent that an international tribunal’s support of a 
right to unilateral secession in Greenland is both unlikely and would be 
imprudent. It is unlikely because the relationship between the people of 
Greenland and the sovereign Denmark is not marred by the degree of 
human rights violations or even a denial of internal self-determination 
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that approaches the severity of the historical cases wherein unilateral 
secession has come to fruition. It is imprudent because doing so would 
threaten the very foundation of global stability. One need only imagine 
a situation where any group of people existing within the framework of 
an existing state could unilaterally declare itself an independent state 
capable of having relations with other states. The result would pervert 
any meaningful concept of statehood. Because states are the principal 
actors in the international arena, their individual sovereignty must be 
affirmed and protected by the boundaries that international law draws 
around the concept of external self-determination. 
This does not mean that Greenland has been dealt an underhanded 
blow. By remaining a constituent part of the kingdom of Denmark, the 
people of Greenland do not thereby forego or abandon their right to 
exercise self-determination. The result is quite the opposite. The new 
self-government framework actually “extends Greenland’s possibilities 
for greater self-determination.”
137
 And while it is limited and entirely 
dependent upon Greenland’s economic growth, it makes possible a 
greater actualization of Greenlandic identity in a cooperative, rather 
than an antagonistic, relationship with the Danish government. And in 
light of the fact that Greenland is likely to achieve economic 
independence,
138
 it seems much more prudent for its people to work 
with Denmark at arms length, retaining the latter as a strategic 
economic partner, rather than by attempting to tear away at the 
foundation of international stability—state sovereignty. 
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